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Abstract 
This study examines the main determinants that affect the firm’s debt choices. Based on a panel data of 
non-financial listed firms in G-7 countries in the period 1994-2013, the study shows that the firm’s choices about 
debt level are functions of several previsions over time about, on the one hand, to the firm’s characteristics and 
its expected performances and, on the other hand, to the economic, financial and institutional system of country’s 
reference. 
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1. Introduction 
The firm’s debt level choice is one of the most relevant problems for managers and financial economists. It is 
still open despite relevant theoretical literature and decades of empirical tests. 
Modigliani-Miller’s theory (1958, 1963) is considered the starting point of the modern theory of the capital 
structure. They argue that capital structure choices are irrelevant both on the value of the firm than on its cost of 
capital (Proposition I and II). Over the years, removing some restrictions assumptions and introducing other 
variables has developed many theories and emprirical researches that postulate the relevance of the firm’s capital 
structure on its value.  
The trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973) tries to find the “optimal capital structure” by balancing 
benefits and costs of the debt with regard mainly to the tax shield and bankruptcy costs. Usually in this context 
also the agency costs of equity and debt are considered (Morellec et al., 2010, 2004). Based on the agency theory 
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) debt has positive effect on agency cost of equity, reducing the conflicts 
between shareholders and management, due to its discipline effect on management (Jensen, 1986), but, at the 
same time, also a negative effect on agency cost of debt, increasing the conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders due to the moral hazard and asset-substitutions.  
Other theories assume that the “optimal capital structure” is not due to the trade-off between benefits and costs 
of debt. The pecking order theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Fama & French, 2002, 1998; Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers, 1999; Myers, 2001, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) argues that the firm’s choices about capital structure 
are based on a source hierarchy: firm prefers first internal sources and if external one are required, debt is 
preferred to equity. Also the market time theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) argues that the firm’s choices about 
capital structure are due to the capital market conditions and the manager decisions over time. Firm’s capital 
structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market (Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Hovakimian, 2006; Ritter, 2003; Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Korajczyk et al., 2003; Myers 
& Majluf, 1984).  
The empirical researches have highlighted many determinants, in addition to the models, that could affect the 
capital structure choices (Frank & Goyal, 2009, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Titman & 
Wessels, 1988). The problem is due to their identification and their effects (positive or negative) on the capital 
structure. It is not unusual that a single determinant has a positive impact on the capital structure choices in some 
studies while negative in others. 
Theories and empirical researches seem to explain some aspects under certain condition of the firm’s behaviour. 
Actually there is still no theory that can fully explain the firm’s behaviour on capital structure or, even more, be 
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able to define the optimal capital structure.  
This paper is a part of the debate. It draws on the most recent literature about the relevance of the economic, 
financial and institutional conditions of the country on the firm debt choices (Fan et al., 2012; Frank & Goyal, 
2009; Beck et al., 2002; Booth et al., 2001; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999). The studies show that the 
economic and financial development of the country and the quality of its institutional system affect the firm’s 
debt level choices. These effects are usually considered separately. The originality of the paper lies in 
considering jointly these effects. In this sense, the paper’s theoretical hypothesis is that the firm’s choices about 
debt level are functions of several previsions over time related, on the one hand, the firm’s characteristics and its 
expected performances and, on the other hand, the general development of the economy, capital markets and 
institutional system of country’s reference. 
This theoretical hypothesis is tested using a panel data of non-financial listed firms in G-7 countries (USA, UK, 
Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy) in the period 1994-2013.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background in which it is made explicit the 
research theoretical hypothesis and its limitations. Section 3 discusses the analysis metholodogy and the dataset. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the analysis results. Section 5 draws the conclusions of the study. 
2. The Theoretical Background 
In literature many studies have focused on the identification and analysis of the main determinants that affects 
the firm’s choices about debt level. The well-known determinants are the firm asset, size, growth, risk, financial 
deficit and surplus, profitability, stock price, taxation and the debt level of the industry’s reference (Denis & 
McKeon, 2012; DeAngelo & Roll, 2011; Muzir, 2011; Rauh & Sufi, 2010; Frank & Goyal, 2003, 2009; Lemmon 
et al., 2008; De Jong et al., 2008; Byoun, 2008; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Brounen at al., 2006; Claessens & 
Klapper, 2005; Welch, 2004; Bancel & Mittoo, 2004; Hall et al., 2004; Graham & Harvey, 2001; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995; Harris & Raviv, 1991). These determinants are functions of the firm’s structure and 
characteristics. Recent studies have expanded the perspective. They have investigated the effects of the economic, 
financial and institutional system of the country’s reference on the firm’s debt choices (Fan et al., 2012; Frank & 
Goyal, 2009; Masulis & Nahata, 2009; De Jong et al., 2008; Davydenko & Franks, 2008; Dinc, 2005; Degryse & 
Ongena, 2005; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Beck et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2002; La Porta et al., 2002; Booth et 
al., 2001; Fisman, 2001; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999).  
The originality of the paper lies in considering all these determinants jointly. The paper’s theoretical hypothesis 
is that firms’ debt level choices are based not only on its characteristics and performances, but also on the 
economic, financial and institutional system of country’s references. Therefore, firm has to define and evaluate 
its debt level sustainability over time based on the systemic and dynamic combination of three main variables: 
1) Firm Fundamentals (FF), that groups determinants that affect the firm’s debt level choices and refers to its 
structural characheristics and performances over time. In this context the determinants used are: the firm 
asset, size, growth, risk, financial deficit and surplus, profitability, stock price, taxation and the debt level of 
the industry’s reference. Therefore the variable groups determinants that are endogenous to the firm and thus 
under its control;  
2) Economic and Financial Conditions (EFC), that groups determinants that affect the firm’s debt level choices 
and refers to the economic and capital markets performances of the country’s reference of the firm. In this 
context, country’s economic performances refer to the GDP and inflations rate. The first, has impact on the 
domestic consumptions, then on the domestic demand, and thus on the firm’s ability to develop in the 
country over time. The second, has effects on the firm’s capability to face debt obligation making it less 
onerous during inflation periods while lot in deflation one. The capital market and bank sector development 
of the country’s reference affect the firm’s choices about debt level, because they define the access 
conditions to debt in terms of amount, time and cost. Greater is the capital market and the bank sector 
development, greater is the capital movements, and easier is the access to the debt at favorable conditions by 
competitive firms. Therefore the variable groups determinants are exogenous to the firm and then out of its 
control. Thus, the firm can only try to manage their effects over time;  
3) Institutional Conditions (IC), that groups determinants that affect firm’s choices about debt level and refers 
to the quality and efficiency of legal, bureaucracy and taxation system of the country’s reference of the firm. 
These significantly affect the investors’ choices, both in equity and debt, due to the protection of their rights, 
semplicity of their actions and the weight of overall tax burden. More efficient is the legal system, lower is 
the bureaucracy and lower is the corporate and personal taxes, greater is the investors’ attention on the 
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competitive firms. Therefore higher is the competitive firms capability to raise capital if their performances 
are in line with investors’ expectations. Also in this case, the variable groups determinats are exogenous to 
the firm and then out of its control. Therefore in this case too, the firm can only try to manage their effects 
over time. 
The empirical model proposed has limitations due to some assumptions made that it is necessary to say 
immediately. These can generate potential sources of bias. The main are the following: 
a) it is used a linear model. It is easy to use although not able to grasp the complexity of the problem about 
debt level;  
b) it is assumed that the capital structure’s choices of the firm reflect its choices about leverage. Also it is 
assumed that the leverage refers to the firm’s financial debt (both short, medium and long-term). Finally, it is 
omitted the specification “financial debt” that becomes simply “debt level” of the firm; 
c) the total debt of the firm is measured by the ratio of Total Debt (both short, medium and long term) / Total 
Assets (book value); 
d) the firm’s debt level is defined based on its book-value. In literature some scholars advocate the 
book-leverage while others the market-value (Welch, 2004; Myers, 2001, 1984; Shyaman-Sunder & Myers, 
1999; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Two are the main reasons for the use of 
market-value: i) the book value is primarily a plug number used to balance the left-hand side and the 
right-hand side of the balance sheet rather than a managerially relevant number; ii) the book-value is 
backward-looking by measuring what has taken place while market-value is forward-looking by measuring 
what will be on the base of expectations and market perspectives. Despite these strong arguments, in this 
paper it is used book value based on equally strong arguments. Among these, the main are the following: i) 
market-value of the firm is difficult to determinate in each moment, subject to the market volatility and the 
data choices by reference to the market value is arbitrary; ii) managers tend to think in term of book value 
rather than market value because it is more easily accessible, more accurately recorded and not subject to 
market volatility; iii) the measurement of the firm’s economic performances are usually based on income 
statements and the book value measure of leverage is considered as best proxy of market value; iv) debt is 
better supported by asset in place than by growth opportunities; v) the main cost of debt is the expected cost 
of financial distress in the bankruptcy event. In this case the accurate measure of debtholders’ liabilities is 
the book value of debt and not of market value;  
e) the dataset are based only on firms reported in Datastream, listed since 1994 and until 2013. With regard to 
the sample two basic assumptions are needed. First, the percentage of listed firms differs widely across the 
G-7 countries as well as the average size of firms listed. Also, in each of the G-7 country listed firms may 
represent only a small part of all firms in the country. But if it is assumed that common institutions in a 
country can influence both the listed firms and non-listed firms, the information gathered from an analysis 
of listed firms will have broader implications (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Second, it is possible that the firms 
between the G-7 countries are not perfectly homogeneous because there are not perfectly homogeneous the 
international data despite the use of a international database as data source;  
f) the sample is made from many observations. Material errors can be possible. Also, in order to manage 
exceptional value for each determinant fluctuation bands allowed are defined. These are built in such a way 
to consider outliers the values out of band in reasonable way. However the data that are not considered in the 
analysis do not change the results significantly;  
g) there are restrictive assumptions on some determinants. First, it is assumed that the development of bond 
market is equal to the stock market one. Therefore the development of the stock market can be used as a 
proxy of the development of the equity and bond market. Second, the determinant legal and bureaucracy 
system is measured by an index called “Institutional conditions – composit index”. It is defined based on 
information cointained in the Busing Doing annual report of The World Bank. In details, for each year it is 
calculated as a sum of Strength of legal rights index, Depth of credit information index, Strength of investor 
protection index, Enforcing Contracts – Time, Enforcing Contracts – Cost, Resolving Insolvency – Time, 
Resolving Insolvency – Cost, Resolving Insolvency – Recovery rate. For the year data notavailable, they are 
assumed equal to the data of the first year available;  
h) each determinant is usually measured by more than one measuring-indicator. The determinant’s sign of 
correlation (positive or negative) is defined based on the prevailing correlation sign of the joint observation 
of its measuring-indicators. 
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3. Dataset and Methodology 
Based on the theoretical hypothesis and limitations as discussed in the previous Section, the firm’s debt level is 
function of the three variables as following: 
Di,t	=	f൫FFi,t;	EFCi,t;	ICi,t൯                                 (1) 
where: Di,t is the debt level of the i-firm in t-time and it is the dependent variable; FFi,t is the variable Firm 
Fundaments for the i-firm in t-time; EFCi,t is the variable Economic and Financial Conditions for the i-firm in 
t-time; ICi,t is the variable Institutional Conditions for the i-firm in t-time. 
In this context, the determinants grouped in the variable Firm Fundamentals (FF) are the following: Asset (TA), 
Industry (I), Size (S), Growth (G), Stock Price (SP), Profitability (P), Financial Deficit-Surplus (FDS), Risk (R) 
and corporate tax (TC). The determinants grouped in the variable Economic and Financial Context (EFC) are the 
following: Bank sector conditions (BS), Stock market conditions (SM) and Macroeconomic conditions (MC). 
Finally, the determinants grouped in the variable Institutional Conditions (IC) are the following: Legal and 
bureaucracy system (LS) and Taxations system (TS).  
Based on a panel data, the empirical regression model is the following: 
Di,t	=	α	+	β1FDSi,t	+	β2·Pi,t	+	β3·Ri,t	+	β4·Gi,t	+	β5·TAi,t	+	β6·TCi,t	+	β7·Si,t	+ 
β8·SPi,t	+	β9·Ii,t	+	β10·BSi,t	+	β11·SMi,t	+	β12·MCi,t	+	β13·LSi,t	+	β14·TSi,t	+	εi,t            (2) 
Each of the determinant grouped in the three variables, is measured by several measuring-indicators as reported 
in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Variables, determinants and measuring-indicators 
Variable Determinant Masuring-Indicator 
Dependente variable Debt level (D) Total Debt (short, medium and long term) / Total Asset 
Firm Fundamentals (FF) Asset (TA) TA.1: Tangible Asset / Total Asset 
TA.2: Annual percentage change of total asset 
 Industry (I) I.1: Average industry ratio of Total Debt / Total Capital 
I.2: Average industry ratio of Net Debt / Total Capital 
 Size (S) S.1: natural logaritm of Revenues 
S.2: natural logaritm of Total Asset 
 Growth (G) G.1: Enterprice value / Total Asset 
 Stock Price (SP) SP.1: Price volatility 
SP.2: Price / Book Value 
SP.3: Price / Earnings 
 Profitability (P) P.1: ROI 
P.2: ROA 
P.3: ROE 
P.4: annual percentage change of Enterproce Value 
 Financial Deficit-Surplus (FDS) FDS.1: Net Cash Flow Investing / EBIT 
FDS.2: Net Cash Flow Operating / EBIT 
FDS.3: Net Cash Flow Financing / EBIT 
 Risk (R) R.1: EBITDA / Interest Expenses on Debt 
R.2: EBIT / Interest Expenses on Debt 
R.3: EBIT / (EBIT – Interest Expenses on Debt) 
 Firm Taxation (TC) TC.1: Corporate tax rate 
TC.2: Income Tax / Net income before preferred dividend 
Economic and Financial 
Conditions (EFC) 
Bank Sector Conditions (BS) BS.1: Domestic credit to private sector / GDP 
BS.2: Domestic credit to private sector by banks / GDP 
BS.3: Loans to residents / GDP 
 Stock Market Conditions (SM) SM.1: Market capitalization of listed company / GDP 
SM.2: number of listed company 
SM.3: Annual percentage change of S&P global equity indices 
 Macroeconomic conditions (MC) MC.1: Annual percentage change of the GDP 
MC.2: Annal inflation rate 
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Institutional Conditions 
(IC) 
Legal Bureaucracy System (LS) LS.0: Institutional conditions – composit index 
 Taxation System (TS) TS.1: Total tax rate 
TS.2: Timing of paying taxes 
 
The sample is a panel data of non-financial firms listed in the G-7 countries (USA, UK, Canada, Japan, Germany, 
France, Italy) in a period 1994-2013. The choice of G-7 countries is mainly due to the fact that they are the major 
industrialized countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) with differences in the economic, financial and institutional 
system. The choice of long period, from 1994 to 2013, is mainly due because the choices about debt level 
required a long period in order to be fully implemented.  
The data source is database Datastream. Other informations are obtained by the World Bank, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European Central Bank (ECB), International Moneraty 
Found (IMF), Eurostat. 
The dataset include 4.142 firms for a total observationsof 82.840 as following: 1.220 firms in USA (24.400 
observations); 305 firms in UK (6.100 observations); 613 firms in Canada (12.260 observations); 1.616 firms in 
Japan (32.320 observations); 194 firms in Germany (3.880 observations); 159 firms in France (3.180 
observations) and 35 firms in Italy (700 observations). The Table 2 reports the firms included in the dataset 
Datastream distinguished by industry.  
 
Table 2. Dataset 
Industry USA UK Canada Japan Germany France Italy Tot 
Aerospace & Defense 41 7 5 4 1 7 1 66 
Alternative energy 5       5 
Automobiles & parts 13 1 4 88 9 9 4 128 
Beverage 12 5 5 12 12 6  52 
Chemicals 52 9 4 135 10 5  215 
Construction & Materials 50 18 12 197 18 13 8 316 
Electricity 37 2 7 10 3 3  62 
Electronic & electrical equipment 113 16 7 143 8 7  294 
Fixed line telecommunications 9 2 1 1   1 14 
Food & drug retailers 14 5 6 35 2 4  66 
Food producers 37 11 8 95 10 10  171 
Forestry & paper 8 1 5 10 2 2  28 
Gas, water & multiutilities 34 3 3 13 5 2 2 62 
General industrials 28 8 4 30 3 4 2 79 
General retailers 72 19 10 68 9 6 1 185 
Health care equipment & service 96 4 7 20 9 1  137 
Household goods & home construction 54 17 1 53 14 4 2 145 
Industrial engineering  25 9 209 32 6 1 282 
Industrial metals & mining 17 1 38 55 4 3 1 119 
Industrial transportation 27 6 4 55 5 5 1 103 
Leisure goods 15 4  23 1 3  46 
Media 34 23 10 17 2 10 4 100 
Mining 10 8 328 4 3 2  355 
Mobile telecommunications 3 1 2 1    7 
Oil & gas producers 53 7 74 8  3  145 
Oil equipment & services 33 4 13 1  2 1 54 
Personal goods 21 7 1 72 14 10 2 127 
Pharmaceuticals & biotechnology 66 5 10 32  3 1 117 
Software & computer services 47 13 10 30 1 9  110 
Support services 69 49 12 52 2 6 1 191 
Technology hardware & equipment 96 7 6 73 4 4  190 
Tobacco 3 1      4 
Travel & leisure 51 16 7 70 11 10 2 167 
Total Firms 1.220 305 613 1.616 194 159 35 4.142 
Number of observations 24.400 6.100 12.260 32.320 3.880 3.180 700 82.840
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The Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the measuring-indicators of the determinants grouped in the three 
variables. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 USA UK Canada Japan Germany France Italy 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev
D 0,22 0,21 0,18 0,16 0,08 0,16 0,24 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,21 0,15 0,27 0,14 
FDS.1 0,60 2,25 0,58 2,13 -0,10 2,13 0,49 2,03 0,49 1,85 0,67 1,97 0,69 1,81 
FDS.2 0,79 1,98 0,81 1,97 0,39 1,48 0,82 2,29 0,63 1,83 0,78 1,79 0,83 1,66 
FDS.3 -0,12 2,13 -0,18 2,14 -0,47 2,18 -0,29 2,04 -0,08 1,64 -0,05 1,61 -0,12 1,72 
P.1 4,04 24,07 9,07 20,30 -7,82 27,07 2,38 7,10 5,74 17,34 6,32 10,80 3,55 7,27 
P.2 2,00 20,87 5,08 13,07 -8,29 25,92 1,63 5,03 3,16 11,25 3,89 7,08 2,27 4,48 
P.3 5,57 29,32 10,90 26,85 -7,96 28,95 2,24 14,44 4,75 27,19 7,71 16,97 2,01 19,09 
P.4 0,15 0,55 0,12 0,50 0,10 0,59 0,01 0,45 0,06 0,42 0,10 0,47 0,06 0,52 
R.1 13,26 32,62 17,55 31,51 -3,24 30,46 25,75 36,02 13,90 27,48 17,05 24,86 8,80 12,98 
R.2 9,10 31,67 13,15 30,73 -5,49 30,81 18,29 34,59 9,47 25,39 11,77 23,36 5,00 12,15 
R.3 1,12 3,79 1,19 2,60 0,57 2,19 1,19 3,98 1,13 5,44 1,13 4,27 1,40 6,71 
G.1 1,31 0,85 1,08 0,76 0,82 1,02 0,59 0,42 0,73 0,66 0,74 0,57 0,60 0,36 
TA.1 0,29 0,25 0,30 0,24 0,30 0,35 0,31 0,18 0,28 0,21 0,22 0,18 0,29 0,16 
TA.2 0,10 0,34 0,09 0,29 0,12 0,47 0,01 0,12 0,05 0,24 0,07 0,23 0,03 0,27 
TC.1 23,62 18,73 22,91 16,82 5,86 13,88 34,17 23,18 20,63 20,88 25,89 18,25 26,00 22,39 
TC.2 0,46 1,51 0,44 1,80 0,18 1,45 0,96 2,89 0,52 2,39 0,63 2,14 1,15 5,36 
S.1 5,38 1,58 5,10 1,40 1,64 2,47 7,32 1,50 4,69 2,12 5,56 1,52 5,80 1,05 
S.2 5,47 1,47 5,15 1,29 2,69 2,47 7,33 1,50 4,69 2,06 5,56 1,62 6,02 1,05 
SP.1 30,54 13,94 26,93 11,95 19,14 21,88 25,22 11,39 20,40 13,13 21,23 11,96 27,58 7,84 
SP.2 2,46 2,85 2,22 2,76 1,25 2,66 1,22 1,30 1,88 2,45 1,59 1,72 1,44 1,32 
SP.3 12,45 28,43 11,63 21,41 -0,65 20,64 19,65 34,25 13,04 29,09 13,28 22,30 12,42 28,04 
I.1 0,43 0,16 0,46 0,18 0,27 0,17 0,55 0,20 0,55 0,21 0,53 0,20 0,61 0,19 
I.2 0,26 0,23 0,22 0,20 0,12 0,22 0,30 0,24 0,26 0,26 0,28 0,25 0,37 0,22 
BS.1 171,68 23,12 151,69 33,85 128,68 31,66 193,50 16,38 109,84 6,44 95,93 12,96 87,26 24,36 
BS.2 50,92 4,30 151,25 33,79 107,35 22,23 132,48 40,30 109,84 6,45 95,87 12,99 86,95 24,32 
BS.3 0,39 0,05 1,26 0,24 0,11 0,01 0,86 0,10 1,05 0,07 0,79 0,12 1,13 0,28 
SM.1 119,35 24,34 133,73 24,77 102,21 25,49 72,95 17,15 43,58 13,19 71,57 23,07 35,18 16,23 
SM.2 6047,40 1592,48 2248,75 278,03 2798,80 1211,21 2997,35 542,19 687,60 118,77 794,70 146,02 273,20 21,52 
SM.3 8,99 18,80 5,91 19,52 10,33 24,51 4,84 26,24 11,56 25,57 6,73 22,40 6,19 24,98 
MC.1 2,57 1,77 2,36 2,22 2,65 1,67 0,96 2,07 1,40 1,92 1,56 1,49 0,74 2,06 
MC.2 2,43 0,92 2,18 0,89 1,83 0,74 -0,02 0,73 1,60 0,60 1,58 0,63 2,51 1,03 
LS.0 108,15 2,07 131,77 5,20 121,84 0,60 138,62 2,52 105,81 2,37 77,76 1,03 106,18 12,75 
TS.1 46,04 0,41 34,83 0,45 43,58 7,49 52,16 1,76 47,41 1,13 64,99 0,18 75,62 4,85 
TS.2 289,90 60,84 106,00 2,00 120,80 4,29 326,00 16,25 198,75 6,91 132,00 0,00 328,35 22,07 
 
4. Analysis Results 
The Table 4 reports the regression analysis results. Only significant value of coefficient estimate are reported. 
 
Table 4. Regression analysis results 
 USA JAPAN UK CANADA GERMANY ITALY FRANCE 
FDS.1 2,224e-03** 
(7,333e-04) 
2,421e-03*** 
(4,915e-04) 
2,781e-03** 
(1,068e-03) 
2,446e-03** 
(8,404e-04) 
 4,361e-03. 
(2,545e-03) 
2,963e-03* 
(1,438e-03) 
FDS.2 -2,224e-03**
(7,521e-04) 
 
 
     
FDS.3 3,406e-03***
(7,104e-04) 
 3,270e-03** 
(1,051e-03) 
 4,379e-03* 
(1,860e-03) 
  
P.1 9,704e-04*** 2,640e-03*** -7,806e-04***  -5,188e-04* 3,760e-03.  
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(1,210e-04) (3,919e-04) (1,905e-04) (2,444e-04) (2,169e-03) 
P.2 -2,712e-03*** 
(1,197e-04) 
-1,431e-03** 
(5,308e-04) 
1,073e-03***
(2,673e-049 
 1,400e-03***
(3,058e-04) 
 -2,246e-03***
(5,660e-04) 
P.3 6,199e-04***
(6,674e-05) 
-1,123e-03*** 
(7,917e-05) 
1,847e-04. 
(1,108e-04) 
-8,123e-04***
(1,098e-04) 
-3,406e-04* 
(1,330e-04) 
-2,005e-03*** 
(4,070e-04) 
-3,297e-04. 
(1,958e-04) 
P.4 -4,513e-03. 
(2,393e-03) 
-8,242e-03*** 
(1,849e-03) 
-8,237e-03* 
(3,930e-03) 
    
R.1 -4,033e-03*** 
(1,181e-04) 
-3,308e-03*** 
(5,810e-05) 
-3,513e-03***
(2,078e-04) 
-1,250e-03***
(1,119e-04) 
-5,029e-03***
(2,706e-04) 
-5,233e-03*** 
(6,524e-04) 
-3,873e-03***
(2,283e-04) 
R.2 2,901e-03***
(1,228e-04) 
1,101e-03*** 
(6,079e-05) 
1,832e-03***
(2,158e-04) 
1,032e-03***
(1,101e-04) 
3,054e-03***
(2,983e-04) 
2,316e-03*** 
(6,923e-04) 
1,756e-03***
(2,512e-04) 
R.3 1,478e-08***
(2,970e-04) 
1,993e-03*** 
(1,945e-04) 
2,699e-03***
(6,658e-04) 
    
G.1 3,378e-02***
(1,692e-03) 
5,822e-02*** 
(2,562e-03) 
6,814e-02***
(2,851e-03) 
2,310e-02***
(1,793e-03) 
4,087e-02***
(4,438e-03) 
1,227e-01*** 
(1,691e-02) 
7,214e-02***
(5,010e-03) 
TA.1 1,866e-01***
(5,387e-03) 
3,395e-01*** 
(5,276e-03) 
1,014e-01***
(7,911e-039 
4,048e-02***
(4,895e-03) 
3,015e-01***
(1,244e-02) 
 1,742e-01***
(1,269e-02) 
TA.2 1,549e-02***
(3,729e-03) 
     6,178e-02***
(1,009e-02) 
TC.1 -1,055e-03*** 
(7,605e-05) 
-4,782e-04*** 
(4,342e-05) 
-7,364e-04***
(1,252e-04) 
-1,080e-03***
(1,183e-04) 
   
TC.2 1,744e-03* 
(7,473e-04) 
2,228e-03*** 
(2,829e-04) 
 3,033e-03***
(7,825e-04) 
  1,703e-03. 
(9,869e-04) 
S.1 2,574e-02***
(2,138e-03) 
2,965e-02*** 
(3,364e-03) 
3,871e-02***
(2,938e-03) 
3,684e-02***
(1,030e-03) 
2,460e-02***
(3,960e-03) 
3,047e-02** 
(9,602e-03) 
-6,815e-03* 
(2,990e-03) 
S.2 9,467e-03***
(2,284e-03) 
-1,010e-02** 
(3,400e-03) 
-9,875e-03**
(3,272e-03) 
5,119e-03***
(1,294e-03) 
  3,551e-02***
(2,884e-03) 
SP.1 1,088e-03***
(9,281e-05) 
1,481e-03*** 
(7,936e-05) 
1,043e-03***
(1,620e-04) 
 5,741e-04** 
(2,033e-04) 
1,255e-03* 
(5,808e-04) 
1,025e-03***
(1,948e-04) 
SP.2 -1,787e-02*** 
(4,786e-04) 
1,238e-02*** 
(7,602e-04) 
-1,333e-02***
(7,594e-04) 
-1,107e-02***
(5,413e-04) 
-1,229e-02***
(1,134e-03) 
-9,046e-03* 
(4,439e-03) 
-1,776e-02***
(1,700e-03) 
SP.3 -1,539e-04*** 
(4,288e-05) 
-1,937e-04*** 
(2,581e-05) 
  -1,592e-04. 
(8,524e-05) 
 -2,001e-04* 
(1,009e-04) 
I.1 7,847e-02***
(1,665e-02) 
 4,559e-02** 
(1,472e-02) 
1,044e-01***
(1,640e-02) 
-4,693e-02**
(1,678e-02) 
9,607e-02** 
(3,388e-02) 
 
I.2 8,951e-02***
(1,254e-02) 
7,673e-02*** 
(1,160e-02) 
9,412e-02***
(1,375e-02) 
3,206e-02** 
(1,199e-02) 
1,074e-01***
(1,368e-02) 
 6,969e-02***
(1,475e-02) 
BS.1  6,525e-04* 
(2,876e-04) 
 4,766e-04* 
(1,888e-04) 
-8,377e-01**
(2,819e-01) 
  
BS.2 -5,617e-03. 
(3,028e-03) 
  -7,642e-04. 
(4,601e-04) 
8,396e-01** 
(2,825e-01) 
  
BS.3 6,285e-01* 
(2,458e-01) 
-9,149e-02* 
(3,602e-02) 
  -3,398e-01. 
(1,940e-01) 
  
SM.1 5,912e-04* 
(2,808e-04) 
-6,379e-04*** 
(7,207e-05) 
 -2,806e-04**
(1,055e-04) 
   
SM.2 -1,300e-05**
(4,295e-06) 
-1,390e-05. 
(7,137e-06) 
     
SM.3  2,136e-04*** 
(3,784e-05) 
     
MC.1  2,108e-03*** 
(6,249e-04) 
     
MC.2  -3,304e-03** 
(1,242e-03) 
     
LS.0  2,020e-03*** 
(3,225e-04) 
  -3,572e-03* 
(1,768e-03) 
  
TS.1  -3,048e-03***      
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(7,913e-04) 
TS.2 4,456e-04** 
(1,450e-04) 
    1,091e-03. 
(5,904e-04) 
 
N. Obs 24.400 32.320 6.100 12.260 3.880 700 3.180 
Adjusted R2 0,31 0,50 0,34 0,44 0,42 0,47 0,45 
Note. Dependent variable: D. The first number is the estimate and the second in brackets is the standard error. 
The coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at: 0 ‘***’; 0,001 ‘**’; 0,01 ‘*’; 0,05 ‘.’. 
 
The analysis shows that the debt choices for the firms in UK and France are based only on the variable Firm 
Fundamentals. Otherwise for the firms in USA, Canada, Japan, Germany and Italy, the debt choices are based 
also on the variable Economic and Financial Conditions and the variable Institutional Conditions with differente 
relevance.  
The determinant Asset (TA) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in G-7 countries except for the 
firms in Italy. The analysis founds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and the determinant with 
regard to its measuring-indicators in all countries. Two are the main reasons: first, debt is a primarily source to 
finance investment in asset; second, asset are usually used as a collateral debt because provide guarantees to 
creditors due their liquidity.  
The determinant Industry (I) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all G-7 countries. The 
analysis founds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and the determinant with regard to its 
measuring-indicators in all countries except in part in Germany (with regard I.1). The relationship is explained 
mainly due to the fact that investments and financing needs tend to be the same in the industry and, thus, the 
choices about debt level tend to be homogeneus among firms. 
The determinant Size (S) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all G-7 countries. The analysis 
founds a positive relationship between the firm’s debt level and the determinant with regard its 
measuring-indicators in all countries. The relationship is explained to the fact that firm’s size are usually 
considered by the investors a good indicator about the firm’s capabilities to face debt and its obligations.  
The determinant Growth (G) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all G-7 countries. The 
analysis found a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and the determinant with regard its 
measuring-indicators in all country. Two are the main reasons: first, debt is a one of the mainly source to finance 
the firm’s growth over time; second, firm’s growth opportunities are a good indicator about the firm’s 
capabilities to face debt and its obbligations. 
The determinant Stock Price (SP) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all G-7 countries. The 
analysis found a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and its price volatility (SP.1) while negative with 
ratios price/book value and price/earning (SP.2 and SP.3) in all countries. The positive relationship is due to the 
fact that the increase (decrease) in price indicates greater (lower) firm’s growth prospects and therefore greater 
(lower) debt capacity. Otherwise the negative relationship could be due to the fact that the higher the price 
compared to book value and earnings, the greater the manager’s propensity to finance the firm’s activites through 
equity rather than debt.  
The determinant Profitability (P) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all G-7 countries. The 
analysis finds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and its ROI (P.1) for the firms in USA, Japan and 
Italy while negative for the firms in UK and Germany. Otherwise there is a positive relationship between debt 
level and ROA (P.2) for the firms in UK and Germany, while negative for the firms in USA, Japan and France. 
There is also a positive relationship between debt level and ROE (P.3) for the firms in USA and UK, while 
negative for the firms in Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy. Finally, there is a positive relationship 
between the debt level and the change in enterprice value (P.4) for the firms in USA and UK. The analysis finds 
discordant results with regard to the relationship between firm’s debt level and its performance in line with the 
literature. The causes of these findings may be many. One possible interpretation is due to the self-financing on 
the one hand, and the financing of investment on the other hand. Therefore, the negative relationship is due to 
the fact that higher are the firm’s performances, greater is the self-financing and then lower is the debt level. 
Otherwise the positive relationship is due to the fact that higher is the debt level, greater are sources to invest and 
then higher are the firm’s performances. 
The determinant Financial Deficit and Surplus (FDS) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all 
G-7 countries. The analysis finds a positive relationship between the firm’s debt level and its net cash-flow 
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investing (FDS.1) and financing (FDS.3) in all countries while it’s negative with net cash-flow operating (FDS.2) 
only for firms in USA where measuring-indicator is statistically significant. The positive relationship is due to 
the fact that debt is a primarily source to cover firm’s financial needs. The negative relationship could be 
explained considering that for firms in USA the net cash-flow from operations are used to finance the firm’s 
activities reducing its debt reliance.  
The determinant Risk (R) is statistically significant and relevant for the firms in all G-7 countries. The analysis 
finds a positive relationship between the firm’s debt level and the ratio of EBIT to interest expenses on debt (R.2 
and R.3) in all countries. Therefore, higher is the EBIT compared to interest expenses on debt, higher is the 
firm’s capabilities to cover the cost of debt and, lower is the firm’s risk and then greater is the firm debt 
capabilities. Otherwise the analysis finds a negative relationship between firm’s debt level and the ratio of 
EBITDA to interest expenses on debt (R.1) in all countries except in UK. In this case the negative relationship is 
not related to the firm’s risk but to the firm's self-financing capability due to the high EBITDA. 
The determinant Taxation (TC) is statistically significant for the firms in USA, UK, Canada and Japan. In this 
context the determinant refers to the firm’s corporate taxes by distinguished between the income taxes that firm 
should pay in order to its tax rate (TC.1) and the income taxes that the firm pays on the basis of the fiscal and 
accounting policies adopted (TC.2). The analysis finds a negative relationship between firm’s debt level and its 
tax rate on income, while a positive relationship with income taxes paid on the bases of its fiscal and accounting 
policies adopted. The positive relationship is due to the real application of the tax shield on the base of the 
accounting and fiscal policies adopted by the firm. Otherwise the negative relationship is due to the fact that 
higher is the tax rate on income, higher is the potential taxes to be paid by firm and greater is the risk of losses on 
income and then lower is the firm’s debt capacity. 
The determinant Country Bank Sector Conditions (BS), is statistically significant for the firms in Germany, USA, 
Japan and Canada. In this context the determinant’s correlation sign is defined based on the measuring-indicators’ 
weigh in regression equation. The analysis finds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and 
determinant in USA while negative in Canada, Japan and Germany. The difference is probably due to the 
different role of the bank system in firms financing. Therefore, the negative relationship is due to the fact that in 
bank-oriented economy, the banking system controls about debt level of the firm are rigorous to the limit point, 
in some cases, to be the bank itself to define the firm’s optimal debt level. In this case the bank tends to keep 
down the debt level of the firm. Otherwise the positive relationship is due to the fact that in market-oriented 
economy, the bank system finances the firm but the market usually to make judgments about the degree of firm’s 
solvency. This interpretation seems confirmed also by the average level of debt that is higher for the firms in 
USA, where the correlation is positive, than firms in Canada, Germany and Japan, where the correlation is 
negative. 
The determinant Country Stock Market Conditions (SM), is statistically significant for the firms in USA, Canada 
and Japan. Also in this case the determinant’s correlation sign is defined based on the measuring-indicators’ 
weigh in regression equation. The analysis finds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and 
determinant in USA while negative in Canada and Japan. In market-oriented economy the relationship is positive 
where is the market to evaluate the firm and its choices about debt level. Otherwise in bank-oriented economy 
the relationship tend to be negative where is the bank to evalutate and to define the debt level of the firm. 
The determinant Country macroeconomic conditions (MC), is statistically significant only for the firms in Japan. 
The analysis finds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and the GDP (MC.1) while negative with 
inflation rate (MC.2). The positive relationship is due to the fact that the GDP growth enables the development 
of firms and therefore the need for funding sources to support the development. Otherwise the negative 
relationship is due to the fact that the growth of inflation reduces the value of the debt at the expense of the 
creditors. 
The determinant Country Taxation System is statistically significant for the firms in Japan, Italy and USA. In this 
context the determinant refers to the taxation system of the country’s reference of the firm with regard to the 
general both debtholders and shareholders personal taxes differently from the determinant taxation (TC) that 
refers to the firm’s corporate taxes. The analysis finds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and the 
determinant in USA and Italy while negative in Japan. The sign of the correlation is mainly due to the real tax, 
net of evasion and avoidance, on bondholders and equityholders. Therefore, if the taxation on bondholders is less 
than equityholders, the relationship is positive otherwise it is negative. 
The determinant Country Legality and Bureaucracy System (LS) is statistically relevant for the firms in Japan 
and Germany. The analysis finds a positive relationship between firm’s debt level and the determinant in Japan 
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while negative in Germany. It is mainly due to the differences in the institutional system between two countries.  
5. Conclusions 
The theoretical hypothesis of the paper is that the firm’s debt level choices are functions of systemic and 
dynamic combination of previsions over time about, on the one hand, the firm’s characteristics and its expected 
performances and, on the other hand, the economic and capital markets performances and the institutional 
system quality of the country’s reference. Therefore the firm has to define the debt level considering not only the 
perspectives about firm's fundamentals, related to its characteristics and performances, but also perspectives 
about economic and capital market performances and institutional system development of the country’s 
reference.  
The analysis finds evidence of the theoretical hypothesis in USA, Canada, Japan, Germany and Italy with 
different relevance while not in UK and France where the firm’s debt choices are based only on its fundamentals. 
The empirical model proposed is suitable for extensions. It can be improved by identifying new determinants in 
the three variable and/or differences determinants’ measuring-indicators without this changes the logical and 
methodological approach. 
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